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Abstract
The objective of this study was to verify the influence of the structure of ownership and 
family management in the cost of debt financing of publicly traded companies listed in 
B3. For this, a descriptive, quantitative research was carried out by means of documentary 
analysis, with consultation to Reference Forms, Economatica database and B3 website. The 
sample was composed of 211 companies in 2012, 214 in 2013, 225 in 2014, 220 in 2015 and 
223 in 2016. The results showed that the average cost of debt financing, in most years, was 
not lower in the group of companies that had a family-owned structure. However, when 
comparing the cost of debt financing between companies that had family and non-family 
management, it was noticed that, in most years, the cost was lower in the group of family-run 
companies. Therefore, it was found that only the family management influenced to reduce 
the cost of debt financing. It is concluded that companies with ownership structure and family 
management enjoy greater alignment of interests between the controller and the manager, in 
accordance with the principal-agent perspective of Agency Theory. The research contributes 
to strengthen the understanding of the theme in the Brazilian scenario and expands the 
existing discussion in the literature by addressing a factor that influences the cost of debt 
still little explored in Brazil. It also increases the literature in the area with empirical evidence 
related to the Brazilian scenario, which still lacks research of this nature. 
Keywords: Family ownership structure. Family management. Cost of debt financing. Brazilian 
publicly traded companies.
Resumo
O objetivo do estudo foi verificar a influência da estrutura de propriedade e da gestão 
familiar no custo do financiamento da dívida de companhias abertas listadas na B3. Para 
isso, foi realizada pesquisa quantitative e descritiva, por meio de análise documental e 
com consulta aos Formulários de Referência, banco de dados Economatica e site da B3. A 
amostra foi composta por 211 companhias abertas em 2012, 214 em 2013, 225 em 2014, 220 
em 2015 e 223 em 2016. Os resultados mostraram que o custo médio do financiamento da 
dívida, na maioria dos anos, não foi menor no grupo de empresas que tinha uma estrutura 
familiar. No entanto, ao comparar o custo do financiamento da dívida entre empresas que 
possuíam gestão familiar e não familiar, percebeu-se que, na maioria dos anos, o custo era 
menor no grupo de empresas familiares. Portanto, verificou-se que apenas a gestão familiar 
influenciou a redução do custo do financiamento da dívida. Conclui-se que as empresas com 
estrutura acionária e gestão familiar desfrutam de maior alinhamento de interesses entre o 
controlador e o gestor, de acordo com a perspectiva principal-agente da Teoria da Agência. 
A pesquisa contribui para fortalecer a compreensão do tema no cenário brasileiro e expande 
a discussão existente na literatura, abordando um fator que influencia o custo da dívida 
e que ainda é pouco explorado no Brasil. Também contribui para a literatura da área com 
evidências empíricas relacionadas ao cenário brasileiro, que ainda carece de pesquisas dessa 
natureza.
Palavras-chave: Estrutura de propriedade familiar. Gestão familiar. Custo do financiamento 
da dívida. Companhias abertas brasileiras.
1 INTRODUCTION
Given the importance of debt for companies, researchers have sought to identify 
the factors that influence the cost of debt financing (Ghouma, 2017). However, despite the 
3Influence of ownership structure...
Race 2020 Ahead of print
investigation of factors being an increasingly developed topic and published in international 
journals, in national literature, as pointed out by Fernandes (2013), Guimarães (2016), Konraht, 
Camargo, and Vicente (2016), Moura, Macêdo, Mazzioni, and Kruger (2016), Palmieri and 
Ambrozini (2016) and Peixoto, Pains, Araújo, and Guimarães (2016), and, gaps still exist, 
given that the number of studies and the evidences on the subject, are still reduced.
In national literature as an example of factors already investigated, which influence 
the cost of indebtedness,  are the ownership concentration (Konraht et al., 2016), level of 
information disclosure (Angonese, Fank, Oliveira, & Bezerra, 2013; Lima, 2009), quality 
of information (Castro & Martinez, 2009; Moura et al., 2016; Nardi & Nakao, 2009), 
socioenvironmental responsibility (Fernandes, 2013; Peixoto et al., 2016) and corporate 
governance (Barros, Silva & Voese, 2015; Caroprezo, 2011; Fonseca & Silveira, 2016).
The influence of ownership structure and family management in the cost of debt 
financing, is a subject that deserves attention and lacks research. In international literature, 
the results are still controversial. In relation to the ownership structure, while Anderson, Mansi, 
and Reeb (2003), Khan, Kaleem, Nazir, and Saeed (2013) and Ma, Ma, and Tian (2017) 
verified that the family structure had reduced the cost of debt, otherwise, Boubakri and 
Ghouma (2010), Hashim and Amrah (2016), Lin, Malatesta, and Xuan (2011) and Tanaka 
(2014) found that the family structure influenced the increase in the cost of debt.
Regarding the management, Anderson et al. (2003) and Lin et al. (2011) demonstrated 
that the family management influenced the increase in the debt cost, but, on the other hand, 
Ma et al. (2017) observed that the family management influence on debt cost reduction. 
Nevertheless, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Tanaka (2014) found that the family 
management did not have any influence on the debt cost.
Thus, this issue still presents shortcomings which require investigation. In addition, the 
research question guiding this study is: What is the influence of the ownership structure and 
family management on the debt financing cost of public companies listed in B3? Therefore, 
the study aimed to verify the influence of ownership structure and family management on 
the cost of debt financing of public companies listed in B3.
The research contributes to expand the existing knowledge about the cost of debt, 
besides collaborating in the identification of its possible interrelationship with factors still 
little investigated in the literature. It also contributes, due to the investigation of the factors 
that can influence to reduce or increase the cost of debt financing, to still figure as a gap 
in the Brazilian scenario. In addition, when verifying the existence of a relationship between 
these variables, besides contributing theoretically the study also contributes for the literature 
empirically.
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2 FAMILY COMPANIES AND THE COST OF DEBT FINANCING
Ownership structure can be defined as being the corporate structure of the company, 
i.e., it is the distribution of shares among the different types of shareholders that a company 
has (Ma et al., 2017; Richter & Weiss, 2013). The shares are distributed among the shareholders 
and provide them with control rights and rights over the cash flow. It is important to emphasize 
that, the greater the control rights and rights on the cash flow, the greater will be the 
influence on corporate decisions (Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010).
In this sense, shareholders can be families or individuals, financial institutions, state, 
numerous small shareholders (dispersed ownership structure), or another company with 
dispersed capital, for example (Hautz, Mayer, & Stadler, 2013; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999). Among the main types of shareholders, according to Moura (2014), families 
have received more attention in the literature, especially after Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
(2000), Faccio and Lang (2002) and La Porta et al. (1999) studies. 
The ownership structure can be defined as familiar, as described by La Porta et al. 
(1999), when an individual or a family is the controlling shareholder, with direct or indirect 
participation. La Porta et al. (1999) study it is pointed out by Claessens et al. (2000) as being 
the first to investigate the type of ownership structure considering the final control, i.e., the 
first to trace the chain of ownership to discover who possessed the majority of voting rights.
When the ownership structure is familiar, many times, the family itself is responsible 
for the management, that is, members of the controlling family act in the main management 
positions. However, this does not always occur. Families can also opt for a non-familiar 
management, which occurs through the hiring of professionals who are not part of the family 
(Masri & Martani, 2014; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007; Tanaka, 2014).
According to authors such as Andres (2008) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
analyzing family management separately is important because of different objectives and 
policies that are peculiar to families. From the agency theory, from the perspective of effect-
alignment, when management is also familiar, conflicts can be attenuated, as the interests 
between ownership and management will be highly aligned (Anderson et al., 2003; Cai, Luo, 
& Wan, 2012; Liu, Yang, & Zhang, 2012). In addition, agency costs from the principal-agent 
conflict will be lower (Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Cai et al., 2012).
On the other hand, a family management can aggravate the conflict principal-
principal. From the perspective of the entrenchment effect, conflicts occur between families 
and minority shareholders. In this case, family management can help family owners 
(majoritarian) to expropriate minorities and other stakeholders (Liu et al., 2012; Peng & 
Jiang, 2010; Villagonga & Amit, 2006).
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Therefore, the conflicts arising from the relationship between principal and agent can 
vary depending on the type of ownership structure and the type of company management 
and impact directly on capital structure and the cost of debt financing (Anderson et al., 
2003; Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Lin et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2017).
In this sense, the families, aiming at the transfer of the business to other family 
members or to the descendants in the future, they tend to act the correct way to improve 
performance and increase the value of the company. Considering that debt lenders also 
benefit from increased company value, this exclusive incentive of the family business could 
help mitigate agency disputes with debt lenders (Tanaka, 2014). 
In addition, families are more concerned about reputation vis-à-vis third parties, 
they have infrequent turnover of managers and directors and strong relationships with 
their stakeholders. The long-term relationship established through the family reputation is 
highly desirable for debt suppliers because families continue to maintain the company’s 
performance in the long term (Anderson et al., 2003; Tanaka, 2014).
Families also have a greater incentive to monitor and regulate the management. These 
monitoring activities benefit debtors and therefore help mitigate the conflict between 
the shareholder and the holders of debt securities, resulting in a reduction in the risk of 
default. Thus, if debt securities holders provide for such incentives, family companies tend to 
enjoy lower debt costs (Lin et al., 2011, Tanaka, 2014).
However, family firms can also extract the private benefits of control at the expense 
of other stakeholders, including debt suppliers (Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010). Opportunistic 
behavior could aggravate the conflict between shareholders and debt creditors, leading 
to an increase in the risk of default. When holders of securities recognize this risk, family 
companies tend to have a higher cost of debt (Anderson et al., 2003; Tanaka, 2014).
Family companies generally avoid raising funds through the stock market, because 
this type of operation involves risk of control loss, since they can reduce the controlling 
shareholder concentration. For this reason, they can prioritize bank financing, which would 
lead to greater financial leverage and, consequently, higher risk and cost of debt (Boubakri 
& Ghouma, 2010). However, in literature, the results about the influence of families on the 
debt cost are still quite divergent, as will be shown in the next section.
3 PREVIOUS STUDIES ABOUT THE INFLUENCE OF OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE AND FAMILY MANAGEMENT ON THE DEBT COST 
In this section, some similar studies are presented, which analyzed questions about 
family structure and management and debt cost. It begins by the survey of Anderson et al. 
(2003) who investigated the impact of the family ownership structure on the agency cost of 
6 Disponível em: https://portalperiodicos.unoesc.edu.br/race
Geovanne Dias de Moura, Jovani Lanzarin, Sady Mazzioni,  
Francisca Francivânia Rodrigues Ribeiro Macêdo, Ilse Maria Beuren
debt in a sample of 252 American public companies, which had available data in the period 
from 1993 to 1998. The results showed that the structure of family ownership reduced the cost 
of debt. However, they realized that when family members occupied the position of CEO, the 
cost of debt financing was greater in relation to family businesses with external CEOs. 
Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009) investigated whether the costs of debt in family 
businesses were smaller in comparison with the non-family ones. For this reason, they analyzed 
a sample of 443 American companies. They found that family-owned enterprises had higher 
debt costs and also pointed out that debt costs appeared to be reflected in households’ 
need for personal guarantees and that such guarantees were an excellent tool for financial 
institutions to circumvent self-control problems and the negative effects of altruism on family 
businesses. 
Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) analyzed the influence of the identity of the controlling 
shareholder and the excesses of voting rights on the cost of debt financing and on the 
classification of rating agencies. The sample was composed of a set of multinational 
companies in developed and in developing countries of East Asia and Western Europe. The 
analysis occurred in the period from 1994 to 2002. They found that the excessive voting 
rights of controllers raised the cost of debt financing. They also found that family control was 
perceived by debt holders and rating agencies as a potential risk of expropriation. 
Lin et al. (2011) verified the influence of family control, family management, and 
excess of controllers’ voting rights on the cost of debt financing. The analysis was carried out 
in a group of companies from 22 East Asian and Western European countries that had data 
from 1996 to 2008. The results indicated that the cost of debt was higher in companies with 
greater divergence between voting rights and rights over cash flow. They were also higher in 
companies that had family controlling shareholders and in family-controlled companies that 
also had the position of CEO held by some member of the controlling family. 
Khan et al. (2013) investigated the influence of family ownership on the debt financing 
cost of publicly traded companies in Pakistan. The analysis was carried out with data from 
the period of 2006 to 2010. The results showed that family ownership influenced debt cost 
reduction and that a higher percentage of households held by the families also reduced 
the cost of debt financing. They concluded that creditors regarded family ownership as an 
organizational structure that best protected their interests.
Tanaka (2014) explored the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and the cost of debt financing. The author’s focus was the CEO’s shareholding, ownership 
and family management, and the stockholding of large shareholders. He investigated a 
sample composed of 196 Japanese companies with data available in the period from 2005 
to 2008. Empirical analysis revealed that CEO shareholding, as well as family ownership, 
was positively correlated with the cost of debt.  Influence of family management on the 
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cost of debt was not identified Finally, it was found that companies with large corporate 
shareholders had lower debt costs.
Hashim and Amrah (2016) examined whether there was any difference in the 
association between board independence, audit committee effectiveness, and debt cost 
between family and non-family owned companies in the Sultanate of Oman, a country in 
the Arabian Peninsula. The analysis occurred in a set of 68 companies with data from 2005 
to 2011. The results showed that the debt cost in family companies was higher in comparison 
with non-family ones. They also revealed that the association between the independence of 
the board and the debt cost was negative when the analysis occurred in the total sample 
and in the sample of non-family companies. In addition, they found that the audit committee 
effectiveness had a significant effect on the cost of debt based on the total sample and 
sample of family companies, but it was not significant for non-family ones.
Ma et al. (2017) analyzed the impact of the absence of corporate transparency on the 
relationship between the family control and the cost of debt in a sample composed of 705 
Chinese companies in the period from 2004 to 2010. Initially, the results revealed that the 
companies of family control, on average, paid a significantly lower cost of debt. In addition, 
they found that family control companies were significantly more transparent than the non-
family ones. They also verified that the effect of family control on debt cost of companies 
was significantly weaker when transparency was lower. In addition, they also investigated the 
impact of the CEO type on debt cost and found that only companies with family CEOs had 
lower debt costs. 
Divergent results in the studies described were found, since, while some authors 
identified a higher cost of debt in family companies, others found the opposite. Thus, this 
issue still presents shortcomings which require investigation. It should be noted, even in the 
studies presented, that investigations occurred in American, European and Asian companies. 
In this way, this issue deserves attention in other countries, such as in the case of Brazil.
4 METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
To meet the proposed objective, a descriptive, documentary and quantitative approach 
research was carried out. To define the sample, initially, due to the peculiarities of the sector, 
in each year, companies that exerted financial activities were excluded. Companies that 
did not have the information necessary for the calculation of all the variables used in the 
research were also excluded. Then, after these procedures, the sample was composed of 
211 companies in 2012, 214 in 2013, 225 in 2014, 220 in 2015 and 223 in 2016. Therefore, the 
research was carried out with data from a period of 5 years.
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In order to identify the type of property structure, a categorical variable called a 
family structure (Fam_Struct) was created, which received value “1” in the cases where the 
last controlling shareholder was a family or an individual (in terms of voting rights), with 
a minimum participation of 10%, as well as in the study by La Porta et al. (1999), and 
the value “0” otherwise. The adoption of this criterion is similar to that adopted in other 
previous studies of the same nature, such as those of Anderson et al. (2003); Steijvers and 
Voordeckers (2009); Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), Lin et al. (2011); Tanaka (2014); Hashim 
e Amrah (2016); Ma et al. (2017) and the data were collected in the Reference Forms: Section 
6.3—Brief History; Section 8.1—Description of the economic group; Section 15.2—Shareholding 
position; Section 15.4—Organization chart of the shareholders; Section 15.5—Shareholders’ 
Agreement.
To identify the type of management, a methodology similar to that of Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) was adopted, which investigated the participation of families in the executive 
board and in the board of directors. Thus, three dummy variables were created, which received 
value “1”   in the cases in which the “CEO (Fam_CEO)”, “Chairman of the Board (Fam_
Chairman)” and even when the “CEO and Chairman of the Board (Fam_CEO&Chairman)” 
were the founders of the company, or members by blood or marriage, belonging to the 
controlling family, or the value “0” otherwise.  The data were collected in the Reference Forms: 
Section 12.6—Composition and professional experience of the administration and the Fiscal 
Council; Section 12.9—Family Relationships.
It should be emphasized that the data on ownership structure and management are 
for the year t
-1 in relation to the cost of debt, as well as in previous studies by Anderson et al. 
(2003), Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), Lin et al. (2011) and Tanaka (2014). The justification 
is based on the fact that the decisions of the past impact on the business operations of the 
present. 
The cost of debt financing, in line with previous studies (Barros et al., 2015; Fonseca 
& Silveira, 2016; Hashim & Amrah, 2016; Lima, 2009; Lin et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2017; Tanaka, 
2014), was calculated each year, for each company, as the ratio of financial expenses and the 
average onerous liability of the year. The onerous liabilities were represented by loans and 
short and long term financing, including the issued debentures and the data were collected 
from Economatica database. The control variables used were: 
a) Age of the company (years which have elapsed since the foundation date): 
companies that have been in the market for the longest time have better 
management mechanisms that help them achieve competitive advantage. In 
addition, usually, they establish favorable reputations and good relations with 
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the various stakeholders. Thus, older companies tend to have lower debt costs 
(Steijvers & Voordeckers, 2009; Tanaka, 2014).
b) Corporate Governance (listed at some differentiated level of B3 governance): 
good governance practices contribute to the reduction of agency problems, of 
information asymmetry and help to protect the interests of the various stakeholders. 
In this way, companies that have better corporate governance practices tend to 
have lower costs of debt (Barros et al., 2015; Fonseca & Silveira, 2016).
c) Indebtedness (Current liabilities + Non-current liabilities / Total assets): companies 
that have higher levels of indebtedness increase the probability of bankruptcy 
and, therefore, tend to pay higher interest rates because they are seen as riskier 
(Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Hashim & Amrah, 2016; Lin et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2017).
d) Size of the company (Natural logarithm of total assets): Larger companies 
generally benefit from economies of scale and stable performance. They also have 
greater capacity to withstand negative shocks in the cash flows and, therefore, are 
less prone to default. Therefore, they are seen as less risky by lenders and tend 
to have lower costs of debt (Anderson et al., 2003; Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; 
Hashim & Amrah, 2016; Lin et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2017; Tanaka, 2014).
e) ROA (Ebitda/Total assets): More profitable companies will have fewer difficulties 
to pay their debts and, therefore, usually have lower costs of debt (Anderson et 
al., 2003; Hashim & Amrah, 2016; Lin et al., 2011; Tanaka, 2014).
f) Growth (growth rate of assets): companies in constant growth may also be subject 
to a higher risk and, therefore, tend to have higher costs of indebtedness (Ma et 
al., 2017; Shailer & Wang, 2015; Tanaka, 2014).
The data on “Indebtedness”, “Size”, “ROA” and “Growth” were collected from 
Economatica database. The data on “Governance” were collected manually at the site of 
B3 and data regarding the age of the companies were collected manually in the Reference 
Forms, for each of the years.
In order to verify the influence of the property structure and the family management 
on the cost of debt financing, an analysis of ordinary least squares regression was performed. 
Presuppositions of normality were observed by means of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; 
multicollinearity, by means of variance inflation factor—VIF and tolerance; and absence of 
serial autocorrelation, through Durbin-Watson test.
In order to examine the existence of homoscedasticity in the behavior of residues, 
Pesarán-Pesarán test was applied. The performance of this test implied in regressing the 
square of the standardized residues (Zre_2) as a function of the square of the standardized 
estimated residues (Zpr_2). The test rejected the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity of 
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waste. For this reason regression was estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with 
robust standard error. Table 1 shows the dependent variable of the equation, the independent 
variables and the control ones.
Table 1 
Variables for analysis of the influence of ownership structure and family management   on the cost of debt 
financing       
VARIABLES METRICS BASIC AUTHORS
D
ep
en
de
nt
Cost of debt financing 
(Cost_Debt)
Cost_Debt:
Ratio of financial expenses 
and the average onerous liabi-
lity of the year
Barros et al. (2015), Fonseca and Silveira 
(2016), Hashim and Amrah (2016), Lima 
(2009), Lin et al. (2011), Ma et al. (2017) 
and Tanaka (2014). 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
ts
Type of property structure
(Fam_Struct)
Fam_Struct:
Family = 1
Non-family = 0
Anderson et al. (2003), Boubakri and 
Ghouma (2010), Hashim and Amrah 
(2016), La Porta et al. (1999), Lin et al. 
(2011), Ma et al. (2017), Steijvers and 
Voordeckers (2009) and Tanaka (2014).
Chief executive officer
(Fam_CEO)
Fam_CEO:
Family = 1
Non-family = 0
Anderson et al. (2003), Boubakri and 
Ghouma (2010), Lin et al. (2011), Ma et 
al. (2017), Tanaka (2014) e
Villalonga and Amit (2006). 
Chairman of the board of 
directors
(PresCA_Fam)
Fam_Chairman:
Family = 1
Non-family = 0
CEO and Chairman of the 
Board
(Fam_CEO&Chairman)
Fam_CEO&Chairman:
Family = 1
Non-family = 0
Co
nt
ro
l
Age of the company
(Age_Cia)
Age_Cia:
Years which have elapsed since 
the foundation date in the 
CVM registry
Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009) and 
Tanaka (2014).
Corporate Governance
(Governance)
Differentiated level of B3 
governance: Barros et al. (2015) and 
Fonseca and Silveira (2016).Yes = 1
Not = 0
Indebtedness
(Indebtedness)
Indebtedness:
(Current liabilities + 
Non-current liabilities) / Total 
assets
Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), Hashim 
and Amrah (2016), Lin et al. (2011) and 
Ma et al. (2017).
Size of the company
(Size)
Size:
Natural logarithm of 
total assets
Anderson et al. (2003), Boubakri and 
Ghouma (2010), Hashim & Amrah 
(2016), Lin et al. (2011), Ma et al. (2017) 
and Tanaka (2014).
Return on assets
(ROA)
ROA:
Ebitda/Total assets
Anderson et al. (2003), Hashim and 
Amrah (2016), Lin et al. (2011) and 
Tanaka (2014). 
Company growth 
(Growth)
Growth:
Growth rate of assets
Ma et al. (2017), Shailer & Wang (2015) 
and Tanaka (2014).
It can be seen in Table 1 that the debt cost variable was classified as dependent. 
The ownership and management structure variables, as well as the control variables, were 
classified as independent, since the purpose, in this case, was to verify the influence of 
ownership structure and family management on the debt cost.
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5 DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
This section contains a description and analysis of the data collected. First, the Student’s 
t-Test results are described, which allow to compare the indebtedness cost average between 
companies with family and non-family ownership structure. The results of the Student’s T-test 
are presented below, which allow us to compare the averages of indebtedness cost between 
companies with family and non-family management. Finally, the coefficients of the regressions 
that allow analyzing the influence of the property structure and the family management on 
the debt cost of the sample companies are presented.
5.1 COST OF DEBT FINANCING AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
Table 2 presents the T-test results, related to the debt cost of companies with family 
and non-family ownership structure. 
Table 2 
Test of average of the debt cost between companies with family and non-family structure in the period from 
2012 to 2016
Cost of Debt
Family Non-family Levene Test T-test
No. Average No. Average F Sig t Sig
2016 125 0.64 98 0.54 3.12 0.08 0.74 0.05
2015 123 0.65 97 0.51 5.52 0.02 1.13 0.03
2014 123 0.39 102 0.44 0.29 0.59 -0.57 0.57
2013 116 0.39 98 0.36 4.04 0.05 0.54 0.59
2012 113 0.34 98 0.32 1.37 0.24 0.37 0.71
2012-2016 600 0.49 493 0.43 9.74 0.00 1.21 0.23
It can be seen in Table 2 that over most of the period from 2012 to 2016, the average 
cost of debt was higher in the group of companies that have a family-owned structure. It 
should be noted that in the year 2014 alone the average was higher in non-family companies. 
However, T-test results indicate that the differences in the cost of debt are statistically 
different only in the years 2015 and 2016. 
In the period from 2012 to 2014 it was found that the average cost of debt between 
the two groups is not statistically different. Although the t-test shows a statistically significant 
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difference only in the years 2015 and 2016, when analyzing the data for the entire period 
from 2012 to 2016, the average cost of family company debt, equivalent to 0.49, is higher 
than the average cost of 0.43 of non-family companies. These results provide evidence that 
companies with family structure may be subject to greater agency problems. 
Overall, the average cost of debt financing increased in the period from 2012 to 
2016. In the case of companies with non-family ownership structure, the average indicator 
increased from 0.32 in 2012 to 0.54 in 2016. In the group of companies with family structure, 
the average cost of debt financing increased from 0.34 in 2012 to 0.64 in 2016.
5.2 COST OF DEBT FINANCING AND MANAGEMENT
Table 3 presents the T-test results related to the debt cost of the companies with: 
a) ownership structure and family CEO; b) family-owned structure and non-family CEO; c) 
ownership structure and non-family CEO. 
Table 3 
Test of average cost of debt for the period from 2012 to 2016 between companies with family structure and 
CEO, family structure and non-family CEO, non-family structure and CEO
PANEL A—MEDIUM TEST 1
Cost of 
Debt
Fam_Struct and Fam_CEO Fam_Struct and Non-fam_CEO Levene test T-test
No. Average No. Average F Sig t Sig
2016 69 0.52 56 0.77 3.34 0.07 -1,04 0.09
2015 67 0.50 56 0.83 6.48 0.01 -1,53 0.03
2014 67 0.29 56 0.51 14.51 0.00 -2,18 0.03
2013 65 0.29 51 0.52 10.12 0.00 -1,89 0.06
2012 65 0.28 48 0.43 5.99 0.02 -1.45 0.05
2012-2016 333 0.38 267 0.62 24.96 0.00 -3.15 0.00
PANEL B—AVERAGE TEST 2
Cost of 
Debt
Fam_Struct and Fam_CEO Non-fam_Struct Non-fam_CEO Levene Test T-test
No. Average No. Average F Sig t Sig
2016 69 0.52 98 0.54 0.18 0.67 -0.10 0.92
2015 67 0.50 97 0.51 0.21 0.65 -0.06 0.95
2014 67 0.29 102 0.44 4.88 0.03 -1,88 0.06
2013 65 0.29 98 0.36 0.21 0.65 -1,07 0.10
2012 65 0.28 98 0.32 0.62 0.43 -0.87 0.38
2012-2016 333 0.38 493 0.43 0.21 0.65 -1,19 0.24
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PANEL C—AVERAGE TEST 3
Cost of 
Debt
Fam_Struct and Non-
-Fam_CEO
Non-Fam_Struct and Non-Fam_ 
CEO
Levene Test T-test
No. Average No. Average F Sig t Sig
2016 56 0.77 98 0.54 8.79 0.00 1.13 0.03
2015 56 0.83 97 0.51 15.16 0.00 1.68 0.05
2014 56 0.51 102 0.44 1.52 0.22 0.67 0.10
2013 51 0.52 98 0.36 13.89 0.00 1.43 0.07
2012 48 0.43 98 0.32 6.92 0.01 1.09 0.08
2012-2016 267 0.62 493 0.43 38.27 0.00 2.69 0.01
It can be seen in Table 3, when comparing the three groups: a) family-owned structure 
and family CEO; b) family-owned structure and non-family CEO; c) non-family property 
structure and non-family CEO; that the averages of the cost of debt were higher and 
statistically significant in the group of companies that have family ownership structure and 
non-family CEO.
These results indicate that companies with a family owned structure that does not 
have a family director may be subject to greater agency problems. That is, it can be seen 
that the possibility of agency conflicts between principal-agent is higher in the group that 
has family ownership structure and non-family CEO.
In Table 4 presents T-test results related to the cost of debt of companies with: a) 
the structure of family ownership and family chairman of the board; (b) family ownership 
structure and non-family chairman of the board; (c) non-family ownership structure and 
chairman of the board. 
Table 4 
Test of the average cost of debt in the period from 2012 to 2016 between companies with family structure and 
chairman of the board, family structure and non-family chairman of the board, and non-family structure and 
chairman of the board
PANEL A—AVERAGE TEST 1
Cost of Debt
Fam_Struct and 
Fam_Chairman
Fam_Struct and Non-
-Fam_ Chairman
Levene Test T-test
No. Average No. Average F Sig t Sig
2016 85 0.61 40 0.72 0.34 0.56 -1.35 0.07
2015 83 0.58 40 0.95 4.15 0.04 -1.32 0.05
2014 85 0.35 38 0.55 3.83 0.05 -1,21 0.07
2013 87 0.32 29 0.95 22.75 0.00 -3,74 0.00
2012 83 0.29 30 0.70 20.62 0.00 -3,08 0.00
2012-2016 423 0.43 177 0.77 19.66 0.00 -2,80 0.01
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PANEL B—AVERAGE TEST 2
Cost of Debt
Fam_Struct and 
Fam_Chairman 
Non-fam_Struct and 
Non-fam_ Chairman Levene Test T-test
No. Average No. Average F Sig t Sig
2016 85 0.61 98 0.54 2.27 0.13 0.54 0.59
2015 83 0.58 97 0.51 2.02 0.16 0.48 0.63
2014 85 0.35 102 0.44 1.34 0.25 -1.01 - 0.32
2013 87 0.32 98 0.36 0.15 0.70 -0.66 0.51
2012 83 0.29 98 0.32 0.17 0.69 -0.75 0.45
2012-2016 423 0.43 493 0.43 2.09 0.15 0.07 0.95
PANEL C—AVERAGE TEST 3
Cost of Debt
Fam Struct and Non-
-fam_ Chairman
Non-fam Struct and 
Non-fam Chairman
Levene Test T-test
No. Average No. Average F Sig t Sig
2016 40 0.72 98 0.54 4.91 0.03 0.95 0.05
2015 40 0.95 97 0.51 17.99 0.00 2.35 0.02
2014 38 0.55 102 0.44 0.77 0.38 0.72 0.07
2013 29 0.95 98 0.36 37.15 0.00 3.94 0.00
2012 30 0.70 98 0.32 24.25 0.00 2.98 0.00
2012-2016 177 0.77 493 0.43 51.52 0.00 4.41 0.00
Table 4 shows that the averages of the cost of debt were higher and statistically 
significant in the group of companies with family ownership structure that did not present 
family members in the position of chairman of the board. These results demonstrate, once 
again, that family-owned companies that do not have family management may be subject 
to greater agency problems. Therefore, just as occurred in relation to the CEO’s analysis, it 
is believed that the alignment effect outweighs the entrenched effect on family companies.
Table 5 presents T-Test results related to the debt cost of the companies with: a) family 
property structure, CEO and chairman of the board also familiar; b) structure of family 
property, but with non-family CEO and chairman of the board; c) non-family ownership 
structure, CEO and chairman of the board.
15
Influence of ownership structure...
Race 2020 Ahead of print
Table 5
Average test of debt cost for the period from 2012 to 2016 between companies with family ownership structure, 
president and chairman of the board; family structure, non-family CEO and chairman; and non-family structure, 
CEO and chairman of the board
PANEL A—AVERAGE TEST 1
Cost of Debt
Fam Struct, Fam_
CEO and Fam_
Chairman
Fam Struct, Non-
-fam_CEO and Non-
-fam_ Chairman
Levene Test T-test
No. Average No. Average F Sig t Sig
2016 59 0.52 66 0.72 1.66 0.20 -1,78 0.04
2015 57 0.51 66 0.77 3.81 0.05 -1.28 0.10
2014 57 0.30 66 0.47 8.71 0.00 -1,89 0.06
2013 61 0.30 55 0.50 7.46 0.01 -1,72 0.08
2012 63 0.28 50 0.42 5.12 0.03 -1,48 0.09
2012-2016 297 0.38 303 0.59 16.77 0.00 -2,81 0.01
PANEL B—AVERAGE TEST 2
Cost of Debt
Fam_Struct, Fam_
CEO and Fam_
Chairman
Non-fam_ Struct, 
Non-fam_CEO and 
Non-fam _Chairman
Levene Test T-test
No. Average No. Average F Sig t Sig
2016 59 0.52 98 0.54 0.41 0.52 0.01 0.99
2015 57 0.51 97 0.51 0.38 0.54 -0.01 0.99
2014 57 0.30 102 0.44 3.66 0.06 -1,72 0.09
2013 61 0.30 98 0.36 0.05 0.83 -0,94 0.35
2012 63 0.28 98 0.32 0.46 0.50 -0.81 0.42
2012-2016 297 0.38 493 0.43 0.03 0.86 -1,06 0.29
PANEL C—AVERAGE TEST 3
Cost of Debt
Fam-Struct,
 Non-fam CEO and 
Non-fam_Chairman
Non-fam Struct, 
Non-fam_CEO and 
Non-fam_Chairman
Levene Test T-test
No. Average No. Average F Sig t Sig
2016 66 0.72 98 0.54 6.62 0.01 1.14 0.06
2015 66 0.77 97 0.51 12.12 0.00 1.75 0.08
2014 66 0.47 102 0.44 0.61 0.44 0.34 0.73
2013 55 0.50 98 0.36 11.65 0.00 1.30 0.08
2012 50 0.42 98 0.32 6.20 0.01 1.03 0.10
2012-2016 303 0.59 493 0.43 29.98 0.00 2.46 0.01
It is possible to observe in Table 5 that the average cost of debt, once more, was 
higher and statistically significant in group of companies that do not have family members in 
management positions. Again, the results indicate that companies with family structure that 
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does not have a family management may be subject to greater agency problems. Therefore, 
in the period from 2012 to 2016, in a general way, when the CEO and Chairman of the board 
were familiar, the debt cost in the companies analyzed was lower, thus, the results indicate 
that the alignment effect overcomes the entrenchment effect in family companies.
Generally speaking, considering the cost of debt financing for companies with a 
family CEO, those with family chairman of the board, and those with a combined family 
CEO and chairman of board, it was possible to verify that the companies that have family 
management presented, in most of the analyzed years, a lower cost of debt, mainly when 
compared with companies of family structure and non-family management.
Therefore, the results indicate that in the research sample the approach of principal-
agent theory of agency prevails, in which a greater alignment between control and 
management (family control and family management) results in benefits, since the cost to 
reduce information asymmetries and moral risk becomes lower and thus there is influence for 
reducing the cost of debt financing, as evidenced by Ma et al. (2017).
5.3 INFLUENCE OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FAMILY 
MANAGEMENT IN THE COST OF DEBT FINANCING
Table 6 shows the regression coefficients of the influence of ownership structure and 
family management on the cost of debt. 
Table 6
Regression coefficients of influence of ownership structure and family management in the cost of debt of the 
sample composed of all the companies
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Constant) 1.32*** 1.48*** 1.44*** 1.45***  1.39***
Fam_Struct 0.35  0.35
Fam_CEO -0.19*** -0.41***
Fam_Chairman -0.14*** -0.34***
Fam_CEO&Chairman -0.17*** -0.25***
Age_Cia -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03
Governance -0.16*** -0.17*** -0,18*** -0.16*** -0.19***
Indebtedness 0.06  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.05
Size -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.15***
ROA -0.03** -0.02* -0.03** -0.02* -0.02*
Growth 0.08* 0.08* 0.07* 0.08* 0.07*
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Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
R-square adjusted 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.26
F-Anova 5.72*** 7.50*** 7.30*** 6.99*** 6.26***
VIF/Tolerance <10 <10 <10 <10 <10
Durbin Watson 1.93 1.94 1.97 1.95 1.92
Note. *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%.
It should be noted that the regressions shown in Table 6 were generated from the data 
of all sample companies. It can be seen from Table 6 that the adjusted R² were between 24% 
and 29%. These adjusted R 2 are similar to those recorded in previous similar studies, such 
as Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), who had R² of 24 and 25%, from Lin et al. (2011) with  R² 
between 20% and 30% Hashim and Amrah (2016) with R² of 21% and 35% and Ma et al. 
(2017) having R 2 of 20% and 30%. In this way, the percentage explained by the independent 
variables can be considered acceptable.
It is verified that F-ANOVA tests were significant (0.01), that is, the set of independent 
variables exert influence on the dependent variables in all models. The results of Durbin-
Watson statistics (between 1.92 and 1.97) showed that there are no autocorrelation problems 
of residues, since the values were close to two. It is also verified that variance inflation 
factor—VIF and Tolerance presented low values. Therefore, in this case there is no problem of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables of the model.
It is possible to notice, still in Table 5, that the variable “Fam_Struct”, which captures 
the existence of family property structure in companies, presented a positive coefficient 
of 0.35 in model 1, when analyzed individually and also in the model 5, when analyzed 
in conjunction with the management variables, however, coefficients are not statistically 
significant. However, despite the lack of significance, the positive coefficients give evidence 
of the family control influence to a higher cost of debt.
This result is aligned to the arguments of authors such as Boubakri and Ghouma 
(2010), Hashim and Amrah (2016), Lin et al. (2011), Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009) and 
Tanaka (2014), that debt creditors may act more cautious when dealing with companies with 
family structure due to the possibility of greater agency conflict in this type of business.
Among the variables related to the type of management Fam_CEO, Fam_Chairman 
and Fam_CEO & Chairman, which capture the presence of a family member occupying the 
position of CEO, the position of chairman of the board, or when both positions are under 
the family domain, respectively, we can observe that the three variables were statistically 
significant and with negative coefficients, either when analyzed individually or when 
analyzed jointly with the ownership structure variable. These results indicate that the family 
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management influences for reducing the cost of debt financing, especially when the CEO is 
familiar, since the coefficients were higher for this variable. 
These results reinforce the findings of the univariate analysis of this study and are in 
line with the results of Ma et al. (2017), which also pointed the influence of family management 
for a lower cost of debt in Chinese public companies. The results are also aligned with the 
principal-agent perspective of agency theory, i.e., it is assumed that in companies located 
in Brazil, with ownership structure and family management, there is a greater alignment of 
interests between the controller and the manager. Then, when the alignment effect becomes 
dominant the cost of debt financing tends to be lower.
It is also noted in Table 5 that among the control variables, four were statistically 
significant. These are the variables “Governance”, “Size” and “ROA” that presented positive 
coefficients and the variable “Growth” with negative coefficients. Otherwise the variables 
“Age_Cia” and “Indebtedness” did not present statistically significant coefficients.
In relation to corporate governance, the results confirm that good governance 
practices can contribute to the reduction of agency problems, of information asymmetry and 
help to protect the interests of creditors. Therefore, companies that have better corporate 
governance practices tend to have lower costs of debt, as Barros et al. (2015) and Fonseca 
and Silveira (2016) describe.
Regarding the size of the companies, it was confirmed that larger companies, because 
they benefit from economies of scale and stable performance, because they have superior 
capacity to withstand negative cash flow shocks, are seen as less risky by creditors and tend 
to have lower costs of debt financing, as argued by authors such as Anderson et al. (2003), 
Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), Hashim and Amrah (2016), Lin et al. (2011), Ma et al. (2017) 
and Tanaka (2014),
As the ROA, the results also confirmed that more profitable companies, because 
they have fewer difficulties to pay their debts usually have lower costs of indebtedness, 
as highlighted Anderson et al. (2003), Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), Hashim and Amrah 
(2016), Lin et al. (2011) and Tanaka (2014).
In the case of the variable “Growth”, which presented positive coefficients, the 
justification lies in the fact that companies that are in constant growth may also be subject 
to a higher risk and, therefore, tend to present higher indebtedness costs, according to Ma 
et al. (2017), Shailer and Wang (2015) and Tanaka (2014).
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6 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The objective of the study was to verify the influence of ownership structure and 
family management on the debt financing cost of public companies listed in B3. In this sense, 
initially, it was found that throughout almost the entire period from 2012 to 2016 the average 
cost of debt was higher in the group of companies that had a family-owned structure. It was 
also found, considering the cost of debt financing of companies with family CEO, those who 
have family chairman of the board and, still, those who have both combined, family CEO 
and chairman, that companies that had family management showed in most years a lower 
cost of debt.
Thus, the descriptive statistics indicated that in the research sample the principal-
agent approach from theory of agency prevails, in which a greater alignment between control 
and management (family control and family management) results in benefits, since the cost 
to reduce information asymmetries and moral risk becomes lower and, thus, there is influence 
to reduce the debt cost, as evidenced by Ma et al. (2017).
Regarding the influence of ownership structure and management in the cost of debt 
of public companies listed on the B3, initially it was found that the positive coefficient for the 
variable “Fam_Struct”, which captured the existence of family structure in companies, gave 
evidence of influence to a higher cost of debt. However, it should be noted that the lack of 
statistical significance for this variable does not allow to state that the result was reliable.
However, the result showed to be aligned to the arguments of authors such as Steijvers 
and Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), Hashim and Amrah (2016), Lin et al. (2011), Tanaka 
(2014) and Voordeckers (2009), that the creditors of debt may act more cautious when 
dealing with companies with family structure due to the possibility of greater agency conflict 
in this type of business.
In relation to family management, it was observed that the three variables that 
captured the existence of family management were statistically significant and with negative 
coefficients. Thus, the results indicated that the family management influenced to reduce the 
cost of debt financing. 
These results have strengthened the findings from the study univariate analysis and 
are in line with the results of Ma et al. (2017), which also pointed the influence of family 
management for a lower cost of debt. The results are also in line with the principal-agent 
perspective of the Agency Theory, that is, it is assumed that companies located in Brazil, with 
ownership structure and family management, enjoy greater alignment of interests between 
the controller and the manager. When the alignment effect becomes dominant, the cost of 
debt financing tends to be lower.
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Thus, regarding the overall goal, the results showed that only the family management 
influence in reducing the cost of debt financing. Therefore, this research contributes 
to strengthen the understanding of this issue in the Brazilian scenario and expands the 
discussion existing in the literature when approaching a factor influencing the cost of debt 
still little explored in Brazil. It also increases the literature with empirical evidence regarding 
the Brazilian scenario, still lacking in research of this nature. 
For future research, it is suggested to increase the number of surveyed companies, 
including those with private equity. Also to use other time periods, in order to identify trends 
in the cost of debt financing of national family and non-family companies. It would also 
be interesting to conduct comparative studies between sectors and levels of corporate 
governance.
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